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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-4814 
___________ 
 
DEBORAH L. HAINES, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION;  
SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2:12-cv-06941) 
District Judge:  Honorable Stewart Dalzell 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
August 14, 2014 
Before:  SMITH, HARDIMAN and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 28, 2014) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Deborah L. Haines appeals pro se from orders of the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania entering judgment in favor of the defendants and 
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denying her motion for reconsideration.  We will affirm.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. 
I.O.P. 10.6. 
I. 
 In December 2012, Haines filed a civil rights complaint against the Secretary of 
the United States Department of Transportation (“DOT”) and the Administrator of the 
Federal Transit Administration (“FTA”) (collectively referred to as the “Agency”).  In the 
complaint, as amended, Haines alleged that she suffered age, race, and gender 
discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment, as well as a violation of the 
Privacy Act, while employed as a civil rights officer at the Federal Transit Administration 
in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  
 The events apparently date back to 2008, when Haines was injured in a bus 
accident and required medical leave.  For the next three years, she continued to suffer 
various medical issues and was unable to complete all of the work assigned to her.  
Despite reporting positive yearly performance evaluations for the majority of her more 
than fifteen-year career as a civil rights officer, her performance evaluations from 2008 
and onward apparently declined.  In November and December of 2011, after she was 
unable to meet the standards outlined by three consecutive performance improvement 
plans, and facing the prospect of yet another poor performance review, Haines retired.   
 During her last two years of employment with the FTA, Haines initiated two equal 
employment opportunity (“EEO”) complaints.  The first, filed in September 2010, alleged 
that her negative performance reviews were pretext for sexual harassment; however, she 
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apparently abandoned that claim in 2011.  In February 2012, after her retirement, she 
again initiated contact with an EEO officer at the FTA.  On March 14, 2012, Haines 
spoke in detail with the EEO officer assigned to her claim, who told her that she would 
receive a notice of her right to file a formal complaint.  The EEO officer then sent Haines 
the notice via Federal Express, including instructions advising Haines that she had 15 
days to file a formal complaint with the Department of Transportation (“DOT”).  Haines 
apparently signed for the package on March 15, 2012, but did not file her formal 
complaint until August 2012.  The Agency rejected it as untimely.    
 In December 2012, Haines filed her civil rights complaint in the District Court.  
The Agency filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment and, after concluding 
that Haines had failed to exhaust the administrative process and that her Privacy Act 
claim lacked merit, the District Court entered judgment in favor of the Agency.  Haines 
sought reconsideration, arguing that new evidence demonstrated that the deadline for 
filing her EEO complaint should be equitably tolled and that her 2010 and 2012 EEO 
complaints should be “piggyback[ed].”  The District Court determined that her evidence 
was neither newly discovered nor previously unavailable and that her arguments were 
contradicted by her original complaint.  Accordingly, it denied her motion.  Haines, pro 
se, timely appeals. 
II. 
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary 
review over the District Court’s order to the extent it granted summary judgment to the 
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Agency.  Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1250 (3d Cir. 1992).  To the extent 
that the District Court granted the Agency’s motion to dismiss, our review is also plenary.  
Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2010).  We may affirm a judgment 
of the District Court on any basis supported by the record, Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 
246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam), and we may take summary action if an appeal does 
not present a substantial question, see 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
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Haines first appeals the District Court’s order entering judgment in favor of the 
Agency.
2
  Summary judgment may be granted only where “there is no genuine dispute as 
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(a).  Here, Haines asserts that there is a genuine dispute as to whether she 
exhausted administrative remedies before bringing her federal suit.  
There is no dispute that Haines, as a federal employee raising claims against her 
employer for race, gender, disability, and age discrimination, was required to exhaust 
administrative remedies prior to filing her employment discrimination action in the 
District Court.  See Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1020-21 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(requiring administrative exhaustion of Title VII claims); Spence v. Straw, 54 F.3d 196, 
                                              
1
 Haines failed to challenge on appeal the District Court’s dismissal of her claims against 
the Administrator of the FTA as well as her Privacy Act claim against both defendants.  
Accordingly, those issues are waived.  See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 
1993). 
 
2
 Because Haines sought reconsideration within 28 days of the District Court’s October 
28, 2013 order, we have jurisdiction to review that order as well as its order denying 
reconsideration.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv) & (vi). 
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200, 202-03 (3d Cir. 1995) (disability discrimination); Purtill v. Harris, 658 F.2d 134, 
138 (3d Cir. 1981) (age discrimination).  To comply with the exhaustion requirement, she 
needed to file a formal EEO complaint “within 15 days of receipt of the notice” of the 
right to file a complaint.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.106(b).   
While Haines conceded that her EEO complaint was not filed within 15 days of 
receiving the notice of her right to file a complaint, she argued that the time for filing the 
EEO complaint should be equitably tolled in her case.  In particular, she claimed that she 
did not receive the notice in the mail.  However, this assertion is undermined by the fact 
that her amended complaint referred to specific details contained in the notice, and by the 
fact that the DOT provided a copy of the delivery confirmation issued by Federal 
Express.  In turn, Haines argued that the period should be equitably tolled because her 
health conditions prevented her from filing a timely EEO complaint after receiving the 
notice of the right to file a formal complaint.  However, she did not claim, nor does the 
record indicate, that she was actively misled or prevented from asserting her rights in 
some extraordinary way.  See Robinson, 107 F.3d at 1022.  We therefore agree with the 
District Court that Haines was not entitled to equitable tolling of the regulatory period for 
filing her formal EEO complaint. 
Nor has Haines established that the District Court erred in denying her motion for 
reconsideration.  A Rule 59(e) motion must be based on one of three grounds: “(1) an 
intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the 
need to correct clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.”  Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 
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591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010).  However, for the reasons stated by the District Court, 
Haines failed to demonstrate that her newly submitted evidence was previously 
unavailable.  Moreover, her motion for reconsideration did not rely on an intervening 
change in law; nor did it establish the need to correct clear error of law. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
